




SPRING 1979The newspapers andacademicjournalsarefull
of theories (sometimes contradictory theories)
which attempt to explain each striking new
development occuringin thisera ofrapidlyrising
prices and wildly fluctuating exchange rates.
Consider, for example,severalimportantpolicy-
oriented questions which have arisen during the
past year or two. What is the basic underlying
rate of inflation? Do speculative influences ex-
plain the steep drop in the dollar's value during
the 1977-78 period? Or has the very strength of
the U.S. economy led to the decline in the value
ofthe nation's currency? The task ofanalysis, as
the following articles indicate, is toapplysophis-
ticated tests to the available statistical evidence,
as a means of devising correct answers to these
questions-and therefore correct policy solu-
tions to the nation's problems.
In analyzing the recent inflation, John Scad-
ding says, "Onlythe systematic changes in prices
are of any use in forecasting future prices; by
definition, the unsystematic, transitory changes
contain no information about the future course
of prices." He then presents a model of how
individuals might rationally extract information
about the underlying inflation rate from ob-
served price changes, and then use that informa-
tion to forecast future prices.
Scaddingargues thatsuccessively higherlevels
ofinflation have become imbedded in theecono-
my since 1960. The underlying inflation rate
fluctuated around 1.7 percent until the late
1960's, averaged about4.8 percent in the 1971-73
period, and hovered around 7.0 percent in the
expansion of the late 1970's. "Neither the
1969-70 nor the 1973-75 recession made a siz-
able dent in the underlying rate; the most they
seemed capable of doing was to stabilize the
inflation rate until some new disturbance carried
it to a higher plateau."
The ingrained rate of inflation currently per-
ceived by the market is very high by historical
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standards, and has stubbornly remained at this
level throughout the current expansion. "This
persistence ofa high perceived underlying infla-
tion rate doubtless has given inflationanimport-
ant momentum of its own as market partici-
pants, in an effort to protect themselves against
future inflation, build this perception into their
wage and price demands."
This point leads Scaddingto a second import-
ant conclusion-"Even if aggregate demand
growth could be moderated, pressure for price
and wage increases would continue to emanate
from the cost side for a considerable time." The
implication for the real economy is not reassur-
ing, since output and employment may have to
remain below normal levels for a fairly protract-
ed time ifany significant progress is to be made
against inflation.
Michael Keran, in his contribution, analyzes
the reasons for the decline in the international
value of the dollar over the 1977-78 period. He
quickly dismisses the popular impression that
the dollar was driven down by speculatorswith a
vested interest in an undervalued dollar, noting
that speculation tends to drive the value of a
currency towards a long-run equilibrium value
determined by economic fundamentals. Those
speculators who most clearly perceive theunder-
lying fundamentals and accordingly take a posi-
tion in the exchange market will generally make
the most profits, while those speculators who go
against the fundamentals will generally lose
money. Because ofthis self-selection process, the
observed value of the dollar should not deviate
significantly from the level consistent with econ-
omic fundamentals for more than a short period
of time.
Keran concentrates on explaining movements
in the exchange value of the dollar against the
currencies ofseven other major industrial coun-
tries in the 1974-79 period offlexible exchange
rates. He first summarizes the apparentmonetary-policy considerations which shaped
monetarydevelopments duringthis period. Then
he shows that actual changes in the "excess
money supply"-nominal moneysupplyless real
money demand-led to changes in prices and
exchange rates in a way consistent witheconom-
ic theory and empirical statistical tests. He bases
his analysis on two propositions: I) theexchange
rate between two domestic currencies will adjust
to reflect changes in the relative domestic pur-
chasing power ofthe currencies; and 2) domestic
monetary developments area majordeterminant
of domestic inflation rates, and thus of the
domestic purchasing power ofa given currency.
Keran estimates his equations with two alter-
native measures-money,and money plusquasi-
money. The former is the narrow definition of
money including currencyand demanddeposits.
This primarily satisfies the means-of-payment
motive for holding money. The latter is the
broader definition which includes currency, de-
mand deposits and quasi-monetary deposits of
commercial banks. This measure includes a
substantial store-of-value motive for holding
money. Both definitions provided statistically
significant results, although the broadermeasure
gave generally superior results. "Given the dol-
lar's role as both an international means of
payment andstoreofvalue,the superiorityofthe
broader measure of money is not surprising."
Keran concludes that an important share of
the exchange-rate movements since 1975 can be
explained by monetary factors, rather than by
speculation orchanges in such real factors as the
terms of trade. His study also implies that
foreign-exchange markets adjust much more
quickly than domestic commodity markets to
changes in domestic monetary conditions. Be-
cause these exchange rate changes can affect the
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dollar price ofinternationally traded goods, the
emergenceofflexible exchange rates can shorten
the lag between money and prices.
Michael Bazdarich raises the question of
whether the recent strength in the U.S. economy
has led to the weakness ofthe dollar. According
to the theory in question, fast economic growth
in a country causes an acceleration in its imports
andthereforea deteriorationin its trade balance.
This ultimately would lead to a depreciation of
the domestic currency.
Bazdarich questions this approach, arguing
instead that true economic growth, as evidenced
by rapid growth in productive capacity, or po-
tential GNP, typically strengthens the domestic
currency. "Growth of this type implies improv-
ing supply and wealth conditions, which can
more than offset the effects ofrising demand on
the trade balance. Sharp cyclical increases in
GNP, on the other hand, can weakenthedomes-
tic currency. These movements typically involve
an increase in demand with no change in produc-
tive capacity, and so do not generate any offset-
ting effects to the rise in imports."
Bazdarich argues thatthe popularanalysis has
missed this important distinction. His statistical
tests indicate no support for the argument that
trulystronggrowth in aneconomywill necessari-
ly tend to weaken exchange rates. "Indeed,
recent. U.S. evidence suggests that the opposite
has been the case. The 'strong economy, weak
currency'explanation ofthe dollar's decline thus
does not appear to have any hard theoretical or
empirical evidence to support it." Bazdarich's
findings-which parallel Keran's-suggest that
recent GNP increases have been mostly cyclical,
caused perhaps by an overly expansionary poli-
cy, and for that reason have been associated with
a falling dollar.